In Response to Descartes

The Argument of Distinction Between Mind and Body

In his sixth meditation, Rene Descartes determines that the mind is separate from the body. A thinking, extended thing is separate from a nonthinking, nonextended thing. He then details the faculties in which the mind and body appear to contain different properties, therefore making them different things. The pre-establishment of I am a thinking thing by Descartes prescribes that I can be certain that my mind exists, and I cannot be sure that my body exists.

Premise: I can be certain that my mind exists and I cannot be sure that my body exists.

Premise: My mind is not extended and my body is extended.

Conclusion: My mind and body are not the same thing.

We can take note of the interactions between the mind and body that are necessary to function, ultimately producing a necessity factor needed for certain abilities. These interactions, however, are relatively unknown and under the assumption that they are made of different “stuff” than of what the observation of dualism is compiled. Certainly, the mind affects the body based on action; the mind makes the decision to act on an impulse and the body physically produces the result. Senses of the individual are being utilized, showcasing the connection between mind and body. However, in order to destroy and rebuild the argument of dualism, the conclusion that my mind and body are not the same thing will be observed in a way of assuming that the body is a physical thing, and all physical things can be doubted since Descartes repeatedly states to doubt everything in order to find truth. The mind, lacking physicality, cannot be doubted because of its status of being a thinking thing. The mind and body have at least one distinct difference in their properties, qualifying them as separate entities. It is understood that the mind and body are intermingled in particular ways, but Descartes’ focus here is elsewhere.

If two things happen to share a property, that does not make them the same thing. My senses can deceive me, or I could even be told something that could have been false. Say I am led to believe that there are two different people with two different names that I had ascribed various qualities. This thought experiment, commonly known as the Masked Man, can highlight the exploitation of a truth that could have been false, as well as the inaccuracy of the senses at play when I make the discovery that the two people I thought to be different were actually the same person. My mind is playing tricks on me, forcing an acknowledgment of the existence of my mind. To take this notion a step further, maybe there is a precious gem that is referred to as one name and called another name in a different part of the world. A person hears these different names and then believes that they are two different gems. However, this a supposition based on cognitive ability lacking in proper awareness from limited subjective experience. The prior acknowledgement of access of the “mental” proves that a “mental” must exist, even when it makes the mistake of one person being two people. Because of the suppositional activity, I am participating in a mental state. I am thinking right now demands the existence of an “I,” which is displaying the ability to ponder. Therefore, I am a “mental having” thinking thing.   

You, the reader, are now named Hannah. Hannah (your body) and you (your mind) are working together. Hannah’s bodily head hurts, so her mind propels her to the bathroom cabinet for medicinal relief. This does not mean that you are Hannah. You are not Hannah. You are not identical to Hannah. You are simply assisting Hannah in a task. The observation of thedistinction between truths that could have been false and truths that could not have been false is relevant here.I could state a truth of that I am a lawyer. This could be false; I could be an artist. The absolute truth located here is that I am either a lawyer or I am not a lawyer- a clear example of truth(s) that could have been false. A thing cannot fail to be identifiable to itself- a clear example of a truth that could not be false. To clarify, Hannah cannot fail to be identifiable as Hannah, because if I say Hannah is Hannah, which is a necessary truth, then this is an absolute truth that cannot be false. Say it is true when her name is Hannah, but if she actually had a different name, then it could have been false. This is a different but related truth. This second truth is solely based in linguistic value with the name/label of Hannah and the possibility of an incorrect assigning of it to a being. The concept of Elvis could exist without this physicality of an actual, in the flesh man- he could exist in a movie. The label of Elvis, however, is a conditional truth.

Pain that is understood by an individual is based on an experience, which is a mixed bag of mental and physical phenomena. When you refer to an experience, you are referring to the pain, and when you refer to pain, you are referring to an experience. The necessary connection between the two phenomena of experience and physical is unclear, therefore unequal, but still recognized as presently occurring.  Model logic maps out how the idea of identity can be true across available realms. Since it appears there is a possible realm where mental phenomena and physical phenomena are not identical, that means they cannot be identical in any world, which is a nod towards dualism.

A new argument is formed stating that if there is truth that you are a soul, then it could not be false that you are a soul. The second premise states that it could have been false that you are a soul and is located within the realm of the abstract world. Logically speaking, A=A and ~A = ~A. If premise A is equivalent to premise ~A, then A is equivalent to ~premise A. If premise A =~A, then A=~premiseA. There is a suspicion of the real mind not knowing if the soul is equivalent to the body, allowing for the notion of dualism. True and false are separate, as well as real and imagined. Asserting the soul lays foundational beliefs in dualism, as the belief of the soul allows for the existence of something that is not the soul and clearly separates the soul from the body.

It is epistemologically possible that we can be without our bodies, but metaphysically it might not actually be the case that it is possible that we can be without our bodies. Imagination is the only available option for exploring epistemological ideas, since the only available support for we can be without our bodies is that it is imagined to be that way. The possibility of our imagination is sorely limited to the best of our knowledge, which is based on experience that we have had during the period of personal existence. This subjective nature of being, a potential candidate of qualia, is difficult to replicate and linguistically express.

Our sensory driven conscious experience allows for brain function, from input and output to cognitive reflexes. Actions (output) are based on will (input) that is processed by connections in the brain, raising question to other phenomena being utilized. Mental responses are invoked by physical events from the physical world. Inputs and outputs can be affected in infinite ways, such as cause and effect in the physical world translating into the mental world, as well as the mental world “playing tricks on the mind.” Dualism cannot be limited to only the physical and mental because of this; a concept such as qualia must be available, upgrading the dual system to a tripartite system that consists of mind, body, and qualia. Additionally, a mental-driven world based on the virtualization of our selves via the year 2020 is scraping away at our established physicality and has challenged Descartes’ notion of dualism in a technological avenue. If I am wearing a VR headset and am virtually experiencing a walk through the Amazonian rainforest while physically laying in my bed, then my mind is in the rainforest. I know for certain that my body is attached to the VR headset which allows for access to the mind. I do not know for certain if I am accessing the physical region of the rainforest or the virtually replicated space reserved for “rainforest” offered by the VR company. These two contrasting ideas deem it troublesome to proclaim that my mind is simply visiting the physical rainforest. Based on this technological concept the location of the mind is irrelevant, but the separation of mind and body is solidified, and Descartes’ argument is sound.

Is the “mind” not located elsewhere? My real self, composed of the consciousness experience of being, whatever the hell that is, is what I am searching for. Bis dann, the simple, flat out rejection of dualism limits the knowledge of the unknown self and does not allow for a better understanding of the new technological world that is rapidly unfolding.