The Mindful Error of God Infused Idealism

Discovering a computer 

George Berkeley’s cease of the existence of matter brings about the question of the origin of sense perceptions, in which he promptly responds by means of his realization of idealism. If I discover a computer, then I am perceiving a computer, making this computer a perceived object instead of an unperceived object. Perceiving something that is unperceivable is a contradiction;  to be is to be perceived, but understanding the direct cause of sense perceptions is difficult when Berkeley strips away physical matter. He persists that I do not have a full understanding of my own sense perceptions and that there “must be some other mind wherein they exist.”1 Through Dialogues, Berkeley establishes the existence of God because sensible objects (ideas)2 can exist outside of my human mind. God is constantly sustaining us by constantly perceiving us, ultimately being the cause of sense perceptions. However, Berkeley’s presupposition of a mind without diving into further detail of what a mind is made up of is a sharp hindrance to his proposal of God (the infinite mind). The human mind must surely be different in experience from God’s infinite mind. Sensible objects exist forever, from before I was born until after I die, because of continuous perception by the infinite mind, but this argument for the existence of God must also address the construction of said mind(s). An attempt at explaining this would work in Berkeley’s favor, as his motivations would be clear with detail of what constitutes the mind instead of a lazy linguistic insertion without foolproof philosophical derivation.  

Continuous perception of this computer

An idea cannot exist unless it is in a mind. Ideas would continually fall in and out the realm of existence if they truly existed only while being perceived by me. My idea of the computer would only exist while I am perceiving it; the location of this idea becomes unknown and outside of my realm when I am not perceiving it. Another mind (Berkeley’s God) must exist with the ability to house the idea of the computer while I am not perceiving it that I then access in my own realm when I am perceiving the computer. Through God’s mind, all ideas are accessible by knowledge coming from experience. I am given access to ideas housed in God’s mind through gaining knowledge by means of experience by perceiving ideas in my life. These ideas never cease to exist because God is infinite. Just because I am not perceiving the computer does not mean that it does not exist because God’s infinite existence proves that ideas are always being perceived by God.  Berkeley’s God exists because of the sensible objects that exist inside of this infinite mind, but sensible objects are simultaneously defined by the mind that contains them. If ideas exist because of minds and minds exist because of ideas, the classic conundrum of “well, which one came first?” quickly becomes apparent. An idea cannot exist unless it is within a mind but a mind cannot exist unless there is an idea within it. 

Finding the computer in a different state

If I am no longer sensing the computer, the idea of the computer leaves my realm. I assume that the computer would remain in the same state as I left it in because I am not actively perceiving it. If I return to my room to find the computer screen to be smashed in, I must ponder why a change occurred when the computer did not exist while I was not perceiving it. The availability of this specific idea of the computer, when not being accessed by me, is in God’s realm, which is fully accessible by someone else (another mind). What is this relationship between these minds? Mental causes mental though this interaction of God’s mind and human mind, according to Berkeley. My perception of the smashed computer is given to me by the agent of God’s mind. I may ask whether we are separate minds or a part of God’s mind. Berkeley would surely argue that I am a separate mind but I can come to know God’s mind through experience. Limiting the definition of the mind to being “something that contains ideas” raises concern of the relationship between the infinite mind and human mind – a pantheistic issue that Berkeley does not want to acknowledge. If God’s mind is truly the infinite mind that is more powerful than the human mind, Berkeley might want to detail a list of functions of this human version and infinite version as well as analyze the relationship between the two instead of refer to them as the same. He might refute this by stating that a mind is something that houses ideas, something that the human version and infinite version can both do, but I do not see this as a qualification that should be the labeling factor. Wax and ice both have the ability to melt but are not called the same thing simply because they share a common factor that makes up their substance. The human mind and infinite mind both happen to have a common ability but that should not make them the same substance that should share the same label of mind. 

Conclusion – We Must Define the Mind

Berkeley claims that there cannot be a world that is independent of the mind, so our reality must be through God’s mind,  but without a detailed definition of this mind I find the soundness of Berkeley’s argument to fall flat because of the lack of guaranteed truth from non explanation. His rather circular “which came first” thesis about how an idea cannot exist unless it is in a mind while a mind cannot exist unless there is an idea in it shows that he was a bit too excited to flat out rebuke Locke’s primary qualities by ushering in a rash justification of assuming God’s existence through that of the infinite mind without a proper consideration of the resonating effects on the soundness of his arguments that come when one attempts to dissect this mind any further than “something that contains ideas.”